

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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PM-03 H-01 INR-05 L-01 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 SAM-01 SAJ-01 OMB-01

ACDA-05 NIC-01 FEAE-00 EB-04 COME-00 TRSE-00 CIEP-01

AID-05 STR-01 CEA-01 CAB-02 DOTE-00 FAA-00 DRC-01

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R 171722Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5701

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

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AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 16362

E.O. 11652: GDS

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TAGS: PFOR, GW, CH

SUBJECT: VISIT TO BONN OF CHINESE DEPUTY FOREIGN

SUMMARY: CHIAO KUAN HUA, RETURNING TO CHINA FROM THE UN, STOPPED OVER IN BONN OCTOBER 9 TO 11 FOR MEETINGS WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, FOREIGN OFFICE STATE SECRETARY GEHLHOFF, BUNDESTAG FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SCHROEDER, AND OTHERS. GERMANS WERE WELL PLEASED WITH TALKS, WHICH TOOK PLACE IN FRANK AND RELAXED ATMOSPHERE. CHINESE STRESSED THEIR VIEW THAT MAJOR SOVIET THREAT IS DIRECTED AGAINST EUROPE; THAT EUROPEANS SHOULD NOT INDULGE IN ILLUSIONARY THINKING ABOUT DETENTE; AND THAT CHINA FAVORS EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND GERMAN SELF-DETERMINATION. MAJOR POINT OF EMPHASIS FOR GERMANS WAS CRITICAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION CREATED FOR EUROPE BY HIGH OIL PRICES. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, IN PARTICULAR, TRIED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT CHINESE SUPPORT FOR ARAB OIL POLICY AND CHINESE SUPPORT FOR A HEALTHY UNITED EUROPE WERE TO SOME EXTENT CONTRADICTORY. SCHMIDT AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO VISIT CHINA IN THE FIRST PART OF 1975, WITH THE PRECISE DATE TO BE ESTABLISHED LATER THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.(END SUMMARY)

1. CHIAO WAS THE HIGHEST RANKING REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRC TO VISIT BONN SO FAR. THE GERMANS FEEL THEY KNOW HIM WELL, SINCE HE HAS BEEN THE MAIN INTERLOCUTOR OF MOST OF THE RANKING FRG VISITORS TO CHINA (E.G., GENSCHER, SCHROEDER, SCHEEL). ACCORDING TO COUNT MATUSCHKA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF FONOFF'S FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT WHO BRIEFED US ON CHIAO'S VISIT, THE GERMANS ARE INCLINED TO REGARD HIM AS THE MOST IMPORTANT MAN, AFTER CHOU EN-LAI, IN THE FORMULATION OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY. THEY NOTE THAT HE HAS BEEN PERSONALLY CLOSE TO CHOU SINCE THE EARLY FIFTIES.

2. IN PRESENTING HIS VIEWS ON EUROPE, CHIAO STRESSED CHINESE CONVICTION THAT SOVIET ARMAMENTS BUILDUP IS CONTINUING APACE AND THAT THE MAJOR SOVIET THREAT IS DIRECTED AGAINST EUROPE. THE EUROPEANS SHOULD ACCORDINGLY NOT LET THEMSELVES BE MISLED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS
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FOR DETENTE. CHIAO REITERATED CHINA'S STRONG INTEREST IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND ALSO IN SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE GERMAN PEOPLE.

3. IN THE LATTER CONNECTION, CHIAO PLEASED HIS GERMAN HOSTS WITH A FRIENDLY GESTURE ON THE "GERMAN QUESTION". IT CAME ABOUT WHEN GENSCHER NOTED THAT THE CHINESE CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE ON THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GDR

HAD REFERRED TO THE "PEOPLE" (VOLK) OF THE GDR. THIS, GENSCHER OPINED, MUST HAVE BEEN AN "ERROR OF TRANSLATION. CHIAO AGREED AND, IN ORDER TO MAKE AMENDS, INSERTED INTO HIS TOAST AT THE LUNCH WHICH FOLLOWED AN ADDITIONAL STATEMENT ON THE GERMAN NATION. HE CALLED IT A "GREAT NATION" WHICH "FOR VARIOUS REASONS IS DIVIDED INTO TWO STATES. THIS, HOWEVER, CANNOT DIMINISH THE ACTIVE CONTRIBUTION OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE TO THE PROGRESS OF HUMANITY, NOR CAN IT PREVENT THE GERMAN PEOPLE FROM ULTIMATELY REALIZING THEIR JUST NATIONAL OBJECTIVES. WE (CHINA) HAVE ALWAYS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE GERMAN QUESTION SHOULD BE SOLVED JUSTLY AND REASONABLY, RESPECTING THE INTERESTS AND THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE IN BOTH GERMAN STATES . . . " THIS STATEMENT, WHICH WAS APPARENTLY ADDED AT THE LAST MINUTE, NOT ONLY PLEASED GERMAN OFFICIALS BUT HAS ALSO ATTRACTED COMMENT IN THE DAILY PRESS. A NUMBER OF WRITERS COMMENTED THAT CHIAO WAS THE FIRST FOREIGN VISITOR OF ANY POLITICAL PERSUASION IN A LONG TIME TO SAY ANYTHING OF THIS KIND.

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AID-05 STR-01 CEA-01 CAB-02 DOTE-00 FAA-00 DRC-01

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R 171729Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5702

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
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4. THE GERMANS WELCOMED CHIAO'S SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION WHILE AT THE SAME TIME POINTING OUT THAT EUROPE IS NOW GOING THROUGH AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT PHASE. THE CHANCELLOR, IN PARTICULAR, SPENT A GOOD PART OF HIS 1 1/2-HOUR TALK WITH CHIAO ELABORATING ON THE DANGERS INHERENT IN HIGH OIL PRICES AND IN THE INFLATIONARY PROBLEMS THAT THESE HAVE CREATED FOR CONSUMER COUNTRIES. SCHMIDT TRIED TO MAKE CLEAR, WITHOUT SAYING SO EXPLICITLY, THAT THE EUROPEANS SAW A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE CHINESE POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR THE ARABS AND THEIR POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE. THE GERMANS ALSO URGED THE CHINESE TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH OIL PRODUCERS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN FROM THE LATTER A LARGER CONTRIBUTION TO MEETING THE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DIFFICULTIES OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES MOST AFFECTED BY THE HIGH PRICE OF OIL.

5. IN RESPONDING TO CHIAO'S STATEMENTS ABOUT THE DANGERS OF DETENTE, GENSCHER STRESSED THAT THE FRG DID NOT REGARD ITS POLICY OF RECONCILIATION WITH EASTERN EUROPE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR AN ADEQUATE SECURITY POLICY; RATHER, THE GERMANS SAW THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY AS AN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY CONDITION OF DETENTE. GENSCHER ASSURED CHIAO THAT GERMAN DETENTE POLICY WOULD CONTINUE TO BE REALISTIC AND THAT THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF ONE-

SIDED DISARMAMENT ON THE WESTERN SIDE.

6. CHIAO SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THE CHANCES FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE BERLIN QUESTION. GENSCHER EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS A MATTER WHICH WOULD CONTINUE TO BE OF VITAL INTEREST FOR THE FRG AND THAT ITS SOLUTION WOULD REMAIN AN IMPORTANT CONDITION OF ANY EXPANSION IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN BONN AND MOSCOW.

7. ACCORDING TO A CHANCELLERY SOURCE, CHIAO ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR ENLARGEMENT OF COAL PRODUCTION IN THE FRG. EVIDENTLY THE UNDERLYING THOUGHT WAS THAT THE FRG SHOULD BEWARE OF BECOMMING TOO DEPEND-
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ENT ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR ITS SUPPLY OF ENERGY.

8. BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED GENERAL SATISFACTION WITH THE STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE GERMANS STATED THEIR DESIRE TO CONTINUE THE SERIES OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITS. THE GERMANS NOTED THAT THEIR BILATERAL TRADE TREATY WITH CHINA WOULD EXPIRE AT THE END OF THIS YEAR AND SUGGESTED THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN CONFORMITY WITH EC REQUIREMENTS. (MATUSCHKA COMMENTED THAT THE CHINESE APPEARED TO BE RESISTING THIS PROPOSAL FOR THE MOMENT. THE GERMANS FELT THAT THIS WAS NOT DUE TO CHINESE DISSATISFACTION WITH THE BERLIN CLAUSE WHICH HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE 1973 TRADE AGREEMENT BUT RATHER THAT THE CHINESE WERE SHY OF CONCLUDING AGREEMENTS ON ECONOMIC "COOPERATION" WHICH GENERALLY FOLLOWED THE PATTERN OF SIMILAR AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE FRG AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.) BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THEY COULD BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON AN AVIATION AGREEMENT IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF NEXT YEAR.

9. IN DISCUSSION OF MULTILATERAL ISSUES, CHIAO MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

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R 171729Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5703

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

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A. CHINA WAS CONCERNED OVER THE EFFECTS OF THE
RIVALRY OF THE SUPER-POWERS IN ASIA AND IN THE PACIFIC
AREA. THIS RIVALRY WAS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT IN THE

INDIAN OCEAN, BUT IT EXISTED IN LESS OBVIOUS FORM ON THE SUB-CONTINENT ITSELF. IT WAS IN THE LATTER AREA THAT IT REPRESENTED THE GREATER DANGER. THE SOVIET UNION WAS OBVIOUSLY INTERESTED IN SOWING DISCORD WHEREVER IT COULD IN THIS AREA.

B. THE OVERALL SITUATION IN ASIA HAD BECOME CONSIDERABLY CALMER WITH THE CONCLUSION OF THE VIETNAM WAR, EVEN THOUGH THERE CONTINUED TO BE "FRICTIONS" IN SOUTH VIETNAM BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT AND THE REGIME IN SAIGON. DESPITE FEARS THAT THEY HAD HEARD EXPRESSED BY THEIR EUROPEAN FRIENDS, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT THOUGHT THAT A POINT HAD BEEN REACHED IN VIETNAM WHERE IT WAS NO LONGER POSSIBLE FOR A MAJOR WAR TO DEVELOP. THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA REMAINED LESS CERTAIN.

C. IT WAS A FACT THAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA THERE CONTINUED TO BE CONSIDERABLE FEAR OF JAPANESE MILITARISM; CHINA, FOR ITS PART, HAD CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESENT JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

D. REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGION CONTINUED TO BE DIFFICULT OWING TO THE GREATLY VARIED INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRIES AND TO THE FACT THAT SOME OF THEM REMAINED TOO CLOSELY ALLIED TO THE U.S.. HOWEVER, CHINA REGARDED ASEAN AS A VIABLE INSTITUTION.

E. CHINA WELCOMED THE FACT THAT AUSTRALIA WAS TAKING AN ACTIVE PART IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND THAT ON MANY ISSUES IT SUPPORTED THE VIEWPOINTS OF THE THIRD WORLD.

F. WITH REGARD TO KOREA, CHINA WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER THE PRESENT UNGA WOULD BRING "PROGRESS". THE GERMANS INQUIRED WHETHER THE CHINESE WERE WILLING TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN UN TROOPS AND AMERICAN TROOPS STATIONED IN SOUTH KOREA. CHIAO SAID CHINA CONTINUED TO FAVOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL TROOPS. HOWEVER, HE APPEARED TO THE GERMANS TO BE RATHER RELAXED ON THIS SUBJECT, INDICATING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT REGARD IT AS A MATTER OF EARTH-SHAKING IMPORTANCE. RATHER, IT WAS AN "HISTORICAL REMNANT" WHICH WOULD SOONER OR LATER INEVITABLY BE SOLVED.

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Message Attributes

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Draft Date: 17 OCT 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
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30 JUN 2005

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TAGS: PFOR, GE, CH, (CHIAO KUAN HUA)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005